INTRODUCTION
Is nationalism disappearing as an ideational force motivating immigrant integration policy making and sustaining or causing policy differences? The comprehensive civic integration policies which have been adopted across Western Europe 2 no doubt reflect identity reactionse.g., to stories of Islamic religious practice, radicalism, urban unrest and ethnic segregationbut of what kind? The 'shared values' discourse which dominates many national debates 3 does not primarily refer to ethnic or religious traditions. Social cohesion is increasingly associated with quite abstractly defined liberal-democratic values and virtues, 4 even within radical right-wing parties, 5 which newcomers are expected to respect and share.
4 discrimination, neutrality, tolerance and equality. 9 If politicians insist that the very essence of Englishness or Danishness is to treat everybody equally and allow them to live as they please, they cannot also introduce policies that further majority cultural agendas. And if they tried, anti-discrimination law and courts would increasingly strike down such attempts. Hence
Jopkke's claim that civic integration policy 'leaves the ethical orientation of the migrant intact'.
10
The article critically examines both claims, arguing that no paradox exists, and that we have good reasons to believe that nationalism 11 remains a central factor behind not just the turn to civic integration policies in Western Europe but also their varying designs. First, Jopkke's argument, in its inspiration from political theory -particularly the work of Will Kymlicka -conflates 'civic' and 'liberal' nationalism and ignores that the latter's acknowledgement of a liberal thinning of nationhood is a stepping stone for the opposite argument about the continuing potency, necessity, and legitimacy of national sentiment.
Second, even the language of liberal universalism is quite capable of supplying national identity discourse with distinctiveness. Cross-state variation may ensue because of the particular prioritization of liberal values (e.g., freedom of speech, anti-discrimination, gender equality etc.), the way these values are interpreted, or the way they have been institutionalized historically. Finally, even when little particularity is left in terms of how liberal values are prioritized, understood or institutionalized, variation may be found in dominant assumptions 9 Joppke 2005, 54; Joppke 2007a, 39; Joppke 2007b, 254-56; Joppke 2008b, 541; Joppke 2013, 599 . 10 Joppke 2007c, 14.
11 Following Smith (2000, 3) , we understand 'nationalism' as ideological discourse having to do with 'the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity, and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential "nation".' Our focus in this paper is on the latter aspects: the furthering and protection of national unity and identity.
5 about the social processes (e.g., the difficulty of required acculturation), whereby national belonging and social unity are reproduced. Table 1 below summarizes the overall argument that is developed in the three sections following the next section, which first provides a brief overview of the empirical debate on the liberal convergence of integration policies and Joppke's claim of a retreat of nationalism. Goodman 2014, 30-35. 21 Goodman 2014, 77-88. 22 To Michalowski, 'just because a country has opted for a restrictive citizenship policy regime does not mean that it dictates social norms and values to be shared by all citizens, as the idea of cultural assimilation suggests.
In this sense, the cases compared here have, with the exception of the Dutch test, confirmed Joppke's (2007, p. 1) thesis that "illiberal means" can go along with "liberal goals" ' (2011, 765 32 Kymlicka 1995, 87-88. 33 For other authors providing similar arguments in the scholarly debates on particular Rawls' political liberalism and Habermas' constitutional patriotism, see Canovan 2000; Laborde 2002; Miller 1995 . See also Uberoi and Modood 2013 (pp, 29-30) for a brief critique of the assumption that national identities must be distinct in order to cultivate national belonging.
friendly discourse, and the civic turn in integration politics, Eurobarometer data show high and stable levels of positive response to questions of national pride and national attachment since 1991 when data were first collected. 35 The sense of particularity which feeds emotion and identity requires no clearly discernible differences. National identities, far from reflecting consciousness of actual social and institutional contexts, are often 'cultural' in an anthropological sense of difference being taken for granted, as in Will Kymlicka's observation that 'what defines being Canadian, perhaps above all else, is precisely not being an American' despite the two identities having much in common 'looked at objectively'. 36 If
Canada and USA after all differ in one having more of a welfare state than the other, Sweden and Denmark do not. Both are small, social democratic, consensus-oriented democracies with comprehensive redistribution and similar histories of class compromise, religious settlement and immigration. Yet, politicians and commentators, while defining the nation in similar liberal terms, still rhetorically position their national communities as worlds apart, also when talking about minor differences in policies or practice, and routinely regard the contrast between very restrictive Danish integration policies and permissive Swedish ones as reflective of deep cultural differences.
Kymlicka speaks of a robust 'underlying national identity itself', 37 a sense of group distinctness or peoplehood, which even survives attempts to destroy and supress languages and institutions. As societies modernize, cultural distinctiveness remains at a cognitive level, as mere attachment to such states, which, in a global division of labour, are vehicles of cosmopolitan values and rights for distinct peoples (thank you to Stephen Larin for pointing this out). 35 Antonsich and Holland 2014. 36 Kymlicka 2003, 363. 37 Kymlicka 1995: 185. 12 in national languages, transmission of historical heritage (e.g., in schools), and knowledge of social practises and role repertoires of institutions. 38 Consequently, the stories politicians tell and believe about the nation's (liberal or other)
kind of uniqueness need neither be true nor culturally rich in detail to work. More often than not there is no need to specify what distinguishes 'here' from 'there' if both the audience(s) and the speaker(s) already believe that a difference exists. A country's integration policies may well be driven by a national ideology, which fails to coherently distinguish its identitye.g., its brand of liberal values -from others. This point trades on a well-known ambiguity in what it means for national identity to 'work'. Nationalism presupposes belief that a nation is importantly different, not that it actually is. Indeed, the 'essence of the nation is not tangible.
It is psychological, a matter of attitude rather than of fact.' 39 Benedict Anderson famously described the national community as imagined, 40 and Simon Harrison adds that this imagination often involves denial and disguise of cultural commonalities and a corresponding narcissism of minor differences. 41 Hence, changes in a country's integration policies, such as tightened rules, may well be caused by nationalist sentiment (rather than, say, party politics), without reflecting some discernibly different national tradition or 'model'. Integration policies may well be nationalist without being very nationally distinct.
Will not a nationalist discourse, which is not based on discernible differences, be so unstable that it is bound to lose out to or be co-opted by competing public discourses? Such instability only occurs if publics and decision makers begin to doubt the way the nation supposedly distinguishes itself. If they do not, universal values easily facilitate a socially 38 Kymlicka 1995, 83, 90-92 . 39 Connor 1972, 337. Second, non-discrimination when it comes to ethnicity, race, nationality and religion is still understood and codified differently in terms of its aim, scope and grounds, and whether it entails positive action, all in ways which are linked with different ideas of nation-building.
Britain and France are often described as having two historically very different approaches to non-discrimination. 61 In Britain ethnic difference is publicly recognized and seen as important in the fight against indirect discrimination and institutional racism, whereas the French republican integration philosophy precludes public recognition of difference. In France nation-building reflects a republican idea of equality, based on a colour-blind and secular public sphere, while the British public sphere is more an arena where national identity is negotiated and challenged to be more inclusive. This again showed itself in the transposition of RED where Britain implemented it in its whole, while the French transposition failed to include a definition of indirect discrimination and provide organizational capacity to pursue cases of such indirect discrimination in the civil courts.
62
By now it is fair to conclude that it is highly plausible that political actors can indeed mobilize the public around liberal conceptions of the nation and that existing institutions and laws do not necessarily block policies inspired by such a conception. So nationalism can still be a significant force in integration politics. Yet, as Huddy says in a critique of the 'minimal in-group paradigm', discussed above, 'it is the meaning of … identity, not its existence that 60 But what exactly does it require, from both the individual and the community, to instantiate successful national identity formation? Politicians conceive of this process very differently and in these ideational differences we may often find the true driving force behind differences in integration policies. 68 We distinguish between a basic collective and individual dimension of such social theorizing of the integration process. On the collective dimension, the main question is whether the reproduction of national identity is understood as organically fixed or as something policy-makers can intentionally steer towards certain conceptions. In other words, who changes -the immigrants, society, or both? This concerns the degree of negotiability of the national community. On the individual dimension, the main question regards the possibility of the individual intentionally changing his or her norms and sense of national identity. Does it take a short or long time, and is it a matter of effort and will or cultural predestination? In relation to these two dimensions of the integration process, we argue that nationalism in its more exclusionary variants increasingly play itself out, not so much, or at least not only, in the form of countries requiring some form of substantial acculturation into a comprehensively particular way of life, but rather as so many ways of insisting, first, that the nature of the country's national identity is rigid and non-negotiable, not only because it is 'ours', but also precisely because it seen as universal and liberal.
Second, that it is very difficult for newcomers to fit into this particular liberal country, because to do so requires strenuous civic Bildung, which native populations have already been 68 At times Joppke does touch upon the existence of such ideational variation. For instance: 'Underneath this liberal framing of integration, which is standard across Europe and the West, there is considerable variation in how far, or rather how deep, the liberal imposition should go ' (2013, 599) .
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through and indeed perfected (and which may be particularly difficult because of the uncivic cultural origins of the newcomer).
The first of the following three sections discusses the normative aspect of national identity. It argues that normative variation, between nations, of liberal values and civic ideals,
has not lost its relevance to the analysis of immigrant integration politics. There are, after all, different answers to the question of who the liberal 'we' is. The two subsequent sections discuss the process aspect of national identity. They argue that we should, nonetheless, be more attentive to how policy-makers theorize the collective and individual dimensions of the cultural integration process, respectively.
VARIETIES OF A LIBERAL 'WE'
Even within the terms of the old distinction, assumed by theorists of civic nationalism, between ethno-cultural (e.g., Germany) and civic state nations (e.g., USA, Sweden and 81 Mouritsen 2013, 99. 24 participatory citizenship -or the lack of it. 82 In Britain, for decades concerned with its own civic deficit, it is less about politics, more about being a good neighbour, volunteering, and taking responsibility for one's community ('look after the area where you live') 83 . Both
Germany and Denmark are more concerned with monitoring the reasonable, and reasonably deliberating democratic citizen, and more fearful of 'religion in politics' than multicultural
Britain with its electoral passivity and weak popular sovereignty tradition. is that the newcomer is always expected to change in some respect. Summing up, the answer to the key question of 'who changes' -the immigrant, the receiving society, or both -designates where to direct government action to facilitate integration. However, another issue is how to perceive the possible impact on individuals that such government action can actually have, as the following question addresses.
WHAT DOES IT TAKE FOR THE INDIVIDUAL TO CHANGE?
Besides its collective dimension, national identity formation is also an individual process.
Answering whether an individual is able to freely choose his or her identity is different from answering whether a nation can intentionally reconstruct its identity. The individual dimension concerns the degree to which individuals control their own (national) identity
formation, and what the individual is seen to be able to do affects which instruments are deemed necessary. If losing one's cultural baggage requires a lot of effort, demands and incentives to participate in relevant arenas of socialization will be tougher and more comprehensive.
From a deterministic viewpoint, national culture is so deeply rooted that to acquire a new one is an onerous project for anyone not raised within the institutional and cultural confines of a given state. To the extent that personal change is even seen to be possible, it involves 97 This deterministic notion of national identity where individuals, so to speak, are thrown into and caught by a certain web of narratives and codes by being born within a specific 98 Jensen 2014, 568.
99 Bonjour and Lettinga 2012, 269 . 100 Jensen 2014.
101 Bonjour and Lettinga 2012, 268. 30 cultural group 102 has also informed anthropological work on contemporary, culturalized forms of racism. According to this literature, much talk about cultural differences in immigration politics is covertly racist when functionally equivalent to a biological racist discourse. When cultural differences are pictured as insurmountable and incompatible, they can legitimate the same policies of exclusion and segregation as biological notions of difference. 103 Yet, as noted above, countries may differ in how their politicians tend to think of the possibilities for voluntary self-ascription. Not all European politicians consider cultural differences insurmountable. But some think that the socialization process, which newcomers face as they try to become part of the nation, is so demanding that it strictly limits the number of immigrants it is feasible to accept.
CONCLUSION
Joppke asks us to consider how 'something that is deemed "undefinable" [can] become a matter of policy in the first place?' 104 We have argued that there really is no need for politicians to define the nation or elaborate on the seeming paradox of using universal liberaldemocratic values to define a national community. Most politicians and citizens are more than ready to accept national particularity as the premise of debates -even on the basis of this apparent paradox. Consequently, it stops being a paradox, in the sense of something inherently self-defeating or inconsequential, and we cannot use such discursive convergence as evidence that nationalism is losing explanatory power. Even policy convergence tells us nothing about the causal significance of nationalism. Nationalism may even be a factor of convergence. Why? As substantial differences are not required for either national 102 Benhabib 2002, 15- Moving beyond the paradox of universalism requires taking nationalist claims couched in a liberal universalist vocabulary seriously and trying to capture their ideational variance. The ethnic-civic dichotomy is inadequate for this task. A more fruitful analytical approach must include the sociological assumptions of national identity formation and seek to test which national settings are more susceptible to nationalist claims. In all likelihood the question is not if national identity is important in Western European politics, but in which national contexts identities more strongly condition policy making.
In conclusion, civic integration policies leave a place for the causal imprint of national identity. To trace this imprint we must investigate the concern policy makers show for a, more or less thick, national culture, which flies under the radar of anti-discrimination, in the form of diverse, more or less particularized, conceptions of liberalism and civic 'we-ness', and, perhaps most profoundly, different processual semantics of national belonging. 105 See the different contributions in Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010.
